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(S. F. No. 19841. In Bank. Mar. 26, 1958.]

HENRY R. JAHN AND SON, INC. (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN MATEO
COUNTY, Respondent; AMERICAN DRYING SYSTEMS, INC. (a Corporation), R.eal Party in Interest.
[1] Process-Foreign Corporations-Service on Secretary of State.
-An aftidavit for service of process against a foreign corporation by personal service on the Secretary of State met
the requirements of Corp. Code, § 6501, where existence of
the required facts was alleged directly and without qualifieation; the statute does not provide that the aftidavit cannot
be made by plaintiff's attorney.
[2] Oorporations-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under
Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, authorizing service of process
on foreign corporations that are doing business in this state,
"doing business" is a descriptive term that the courts have
equated with such minimum eontacts with the state that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and sub£tantial justice.
[8] Id. - Foreign Oorporations - Doing Business. - "Doing bnsiness" within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 411, is synonymons with the power of the state to subject foreign corporations to local proces~ .
[4] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Under the minimum contacts test, purchase of goods by a foreign corporation within this state as a regular part of its business can

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, § 34 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Foreign Corporations, § 360 et seq.
licK. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 57(2); [2-4] Corporations,
§ 898; [5-9] Corporations, § 900.
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constitute doing business rendering it amenable to proeeB8 in"
actions engendered by such activities.
<
[6] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Due Process.-It is suf.
ficient for purposes of due process that a suit against a foreign
corporation be based on a contract that has substantial eon·
nection with the state asserting jurisdiction; the presenoe
theory of jurisdiction is not applicable.
(6] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Due Process.-The exercise by a foreign corporation of the privilege of conducting
activities within a state may give rise to obligations and, so far
as those obligations arise out of or are connected with activi.
ties within the state, a procedure requiring the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them does not offend
against the due process clause.
[7] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Liability to Be Sued.Whenever litigation arises out of business transactions eon·
ducted across state lines between parties whose principal
places of business are in different states, there may be hard·
ship to the party required to litigate away from home, but
there is no constitutional requirement that this hardship must
invariably be borne by plaintiff whenever defendant is not
deemed present in the state of plaintiff's residence.
[8a, 8b] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Liability to Be Sued.
-A foreign corporation could be subject to the jurisdiction of
California courts where it made regular purchases of goods
through interstate communication from plaintiff as its exclusive
export agent, took title to the goods in this state, directed its
agent how and when to ship them, entered into a similar course
of business dealings with defendant partnership, reaped the
benefits of our laws that protected its goods while they were
in the state and had access to the state courts to enforce any
rights in regard to these transactions; though some of the
evidence might be more readily available in New York, there,
was other evidence already in California, the corporation's
burden of defending in California was no greater than plaintiff's burden of suing in New York, and a denial of jurisdiction would lead only to a duplicity of litigation to determine
the existence or nonexistence of a single tortious conspiracy.
[9] Id.-Foreign Oorporations-Actions-Due Process.-Whether
due process is satisfied in a suit against a foreign corporation
must depend on the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.

I

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of San Mateo County to set aside its order for substituted serv- I
ice of process and to quash service of summons on petitioner. .
Writ denied.
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Joseph C. Meyerstein and Donald J. Kennedy for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Pedder, Ferguson & Pedder and Robert J. Pedder for Real
Party in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, Henry R. Jahn and Son, Inc.,
seeks a writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court of San
Mateo County to set aside its order for substituted service of
process and to quash service of summons on petitioner in an
action brought by plainti1f, the real party in interest in this
proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.8.) Dante J. Cacciari and Alexander Columbo, individually and as copartners
doing business as the C & C Company, were joined as defendants in plainti1f's action. The superior court made an order
allowing plainti1f to serve process on petitioner pursuant to
section 6501 of the Corporations Code.· Thereafter petitioner
appeared specially and moved to set aside the order for service
of process and to quash the service of summons. These motions
were denied.
Plainti1f alleged in its complaint that it entered into a series
of three-party contracts with Jahn and various distributors in
South and Central America for the purpose of marketing
grain driers in those areas. J ahn had the exclusive right to
sell plainti1f's products, and the distributors agreed not to
handle competing products. Pursuant to these contracts,
J ahn purchased driers from plainti1f and resold them through
the various distributors. Business was conducted accordingly
for over two years.
Defendants Cacciari and Columbo were associated with a
company that manufactured driers for plainti1f according to
secret plans and specifications supplied by plainti1f. They
resigned from that company, taking plainti1f's plans and specifications with them. Thereafter they conspired with J ahn to
-Section 6501 of the Corporations Code reads: "If the agent desig·
Dated for the aemee of process be a natural person and e&Dnot be found
with due diligence at the address atated in the designation or if IUeb
agent be a corporation and no person e&D be found with due diligence
to whom the delivery authorized by Seetion 6500 may be made for the
purpoee of delivery to such corporate agent. or it the agent designated
is no longer authorized to act, or it no agent has been designated and it
no one of-the officers or agents of the corporation specified in Section
6500 can be found after diligent search and it is so shown by affidavit to
the satisfaction of the court or judge, then the court or judge may make
all order that lervice be made by personal delivery to the Secretary of

)
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take over plaintiff's business. Cacciari and Columbo formed a
California partnership to manufacture and sell driers similar
to plaintiff's driers, making use of plaintiff's plans and specifications. Jahn became the partnership's exclusive agent for
exporting its driers. Jahn and the partners conspired to
induce breaches of plaintiff's exclusiye contracts with distribu·
tors, making use of confidential mailing lists and other data
bearing on plaintiff's South and Central American business.
Plaintiff prayed that defendants be enjoined from inducing
breaches of its distributorship contracts, using plaintiff's confidential mailing lists and other customer data, manufacturing
and selling driers similar to plaintiff's driers, and using plaintiff's plans and specifications. It also prayed for an accounting of the business diverted by the foregoing activities, the
appointment of a receiver, and exemplary damages.
[1] There is no merit in Jahn's contention that the affi·
davit for service on the Secretary of State did not meet the
requirements of Corporations Code section 6501. The existence
of the required facts was alleged directly and without quali.
fication. (Of., Oolumbia Screw 00. v. 'Warner Lock Co., 138
Cal. 445, 447 [71 P. 498].) The statute does not provide
that the affidavit cannot be made by the plaintiff's attorney.
Jahn further contends that it was not and is not doing
business in this state within the meaning of Code of Civil
Procedure, section 411, subdivision 2, and is therefore not
subject to service of process pursuant to Corporations Code
section 6501.
[S] The statute authorizes service of process on foreign
corporations that are "doing business in this State." That
term is a descriptive one that the courts have equated with
such minimum contacts with the state "that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.''' (International Shoe Co. v. Wash.
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 [66 S.Ot. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R.
1057].) Whatever limitation it imposes is equivalent to that
of the due process clause. [3] '" [D]oing business' within
the meaning of section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
synonymous with the power of the state to subject foreign
corporations to local process. " (Eclipse Fuel etc. Co. v. SupeState or to an assistant or deputy secretary of state of two copies of the
process together with two copies of the order, except thnt if the corpora·
tion to be lIerved has not filed the statement required to be filed b,.
Section 6403 then only one copy of the process and order need be delivered but the order shan include and Bet forth an address to which such
proeeaa shall be lent b7 the Secretary of State."

)
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rior Oourt, 148 Cal.App.2d 736, 738 [307 P.2d 739] ; see also
Gray v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 155 Cal.App.2d 55, 58
[317 P.2d 114]; McOlanahan v. Trans-America Ins. 00., 149
Cal.App.2d 171, 172 [307 P.2d 1023] ; Jeter v. Austin Trailer
Equipment 00., 122 Cal.App.2d 376, 387 [265 P.2d 130]:
Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories, Inc., 118 Cal.App.
2d 211, 218-224 [257 P.2d 727J, and cases cited; LeVecke v.
Griesedieck Western Brewing 00., 233 F.2d 772, 775; Kenny
v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F.Supp. 838,850.)
[4] Jahn's purchase of goods in this state is a regular part
of its business. It nevertheless contends that it is not amenable to suit here, invoking Rosenberg Bros. tJ 00. v. Curtis
Brown 00., 260 U.S. 516 [43 S.Ct. 170, 67 L.Ed. 372]. The
United States Supreme Court, however, has advanced beyond
the presence theory of jurisdiction underlying that ease.
(McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 [78
S.Ct. 199, 200, 2 L.Ed.2d 223] ; see also International 8hoe
00. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316~317 [66 S.Ot. 154, 90
L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) Under the minimum contacts
test of the International Shoe case regular sales solicitation
alone can constitute doing business rendering the foreign corporation amenable to process in actions engendered by such
activities. (See TratJelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643, 648-649 [70 S.Ct. 927. 94 L.Ed. 11541; Nippert v. Ricl!mond, 327 U.S. 416. 426 [66 S.Ot. 586, 90 L.Ed. 760. 162
A.IJ.R. 844J ; Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115.
119; Frene v. L01lisville Oement 00., 77 App.D.C. 129 [134
F.2d 511, 515-517, 146 A.L.R. 926] ; Jeter v. Austi1l Trailer
Equipment 00., 122 Cal.App.2d 376, 385 [265 P.2d 130];
Kont:nklijke L. M. v. Superior Oourt, 107 Cal.App.2d 495, 500
[237 P.2d 297J.) Since there is no distinction for jurisdic·
tional purposes between regular selling and regular buying
(Sterling Novelty Oorp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distributing 00.,
299 N.Y. 208. 210 fR6 N.E.2d 564] : Star Elkhor1l Coal 00. v.
Red Ash Pocahontas Ooal 00., 102 F.Supp. 258. 259), the
Rosenberg ease is as obsolete for the one as for the other.
Many cases antt'('eding the Rosenberg case and many since the
International Shot' case have sustained jurisdiction on the
basis of the deft'ndant's purchasing activities in the state.
<Colorado 11'011. Works v. Sierra Grande Min. 00., 15 Colo.
499 [25 P. 325. 327-328.22 Am.St.Rep. 433] ; Premo Specialty
Mfg. 00. v. Jef'..~ey-Oreme Co., 118 O.C.A. 458 [200 F. 352. 356.
43 L.R.A.N.S. 1015]: D1tr1gan, Hood & 00. v. C. F. Bally.
Limited, 271 F. 517, 519; Payne & Joubert v. East Unw1I
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Lumber Co., 109 La. 706 [33 So. 739, 740.741] ; Duluth Log
Co. v. Pulpwood Co., 187 Minn. 812 [163 N.W. 520, 521];
Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank cf Hirsch Distributing Co.,
299 N.Y. 208, 212 [86 N.E.2d 564J: National Furniture Co. v.
Wm. Sruigelma'1l cf Co., 198 App.Div. 672 [190 N.Y.S. 831.
832] : Scheier v. Stoff, 142 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717; Star Elkhorfl
Coal Co. v. Bed Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102 F.Supp. 258,
259; see also Johnson v. Atlantic cf Pacific Fisheries Co., 128
Wash. 578 [224 P. 13, 14].)
The Supreme Court has emphasized its departure from
the presence test by the significance it now attaches to the
fact that the cause of action arises out of the defendant's
contacts with the state asserting jurisdiction. The Rosenberg
case deemed it immaterial that the cause of action arose out
of the corporation's New York activities, on the ground that
its total activities there did not support the conclusion that
it was present. [5] Now, however, it "issufticient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had substantial connection with . . . [the J State. "
(McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 [78
S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223].) [6] "But to the extent
that a corporation exercises the privilege of condncting activi·
ties within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the
laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give
rise to obligations, and, 80 far as those obligations arise out
of 9r are connected with the activities within the state, 8
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to 8
suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances. hardly bE'
said to be undue." (International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. 161 A.L.R.
1057].)
[7] Whenever litigation arises out of business transactions
conducted across state lines between parties whose principal
places of business are in different states, there may be hardship
to the party required to litigate away from home. There is
DO constitutional requirement, however. that this hardship
must invariably be borne by the plaintiff whenever the defend·
ant is. not deemed present in the state of plaintiff's residence.
In some circumstances there is adequate basis for jurisdiction
when the .defendant has ele(lted to dea] with the plaintiff
even though only by mail. (McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 [78 S.Ct. 199. 201. 2 L.Ed.2d 2231 : Parma·
lee v. Iowa State TraveUflg Mefl's AssfI .. 206 F.2d 518, 522.)
Again, there is jurisdiction when the cause of action arose

)
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out of the breach of a contract made and to be performed in
the state (Campania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co.,
205 Md. 237 [107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372, 49 A.L.R.2d 646],
cert. den., 348 U.S. 943 r75 S.Ct. 365, 99 L.Ed. 7881 ; see also
S. Howes Co. v. W. P Milling Co., - - Okla. - - [277 P.2d
655, 657-658]) or even out of a mere isolated act in the state
by the defendant or his agent. (Nelso11 v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d
378 [143 N.E.2d 673]; Smyth v. Twin State ImprOfJeme11t
Corp., 116 Vt. 569 [80 A.2d 664. 25 A.L.R.2d 11931: Hess v
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 [47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091] ; Johns v.
Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F.Supp. 654.)
[8aJ We need not here determinl' whether an action arising
from an isolated purchase of goods 'here through interstatf'
communication would subject Jahn to the jurisdiction of thf'
California courts. Jahn made regular purchases from plaintiff as its exclusive export agent. It took title to the goodR
in this state. It directed its agent how and where to ship them
Even after it ceased doing business with plaintiff, it entered
into a similar course of business dealings with defendant
partnership. It reaped the benefits of our laws that protected
its goods while they were here, and it had access to our courtR
to enforce any rights in regard to these transactions. The
alleged cause of action grew directly out of Jahn's relationship with plaintiff and the partnership in this state. (See
Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Industries, 156 F.2d 351, 354; Steiner v.
20th Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190, 198: De Golia v.
Twentieth Centu'1/-Fox Films Corp., 140 F.Supp. 316.) Although some of the evidence may be more readily available
in New York, there is other evidence already here. That which
must be secured from overseas can as easily be presented here
as in New York. The inconvenience to Jahn in defending here is relevant (lnternatio11.al Shoe Co. v. Wn..'1h.ingtoft.
326 U.S. 310, 317 r66 s.Ct. 154. 90 L.Ed. 95. 161 A.L.R.
1057] ). but "Looking back over this long history of litigation
It trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissiblp
'!cope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other
nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy over the years Today
many commercial transactions touch two or more States and
may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increal'll' in the amount of business conducted by mail across
state lines. At the same time modern transportation and
communication have made it much less burdensome for a party

)
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sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic
activity." (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 [78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223].) It also bears
emphasis that if plaintiff were unable to bring an action
against J ahn here, it would be similarly frustrated with
regard to Jahn's codefendants in New York. Two actions
instead of one would then be necessary to litigate the existence
or nonexistence of a single tortious conspiracy.
[9] "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark
the boundary line between those activities which justify the
subjection of a corporation to suit. and those which do not,
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not
merely, as has sometimes been suggested. whether the activity,
which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its
agents in another state, is a little more or a little less.
[Citations. ) Whether due process is satisfied must depend
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation
to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." (International Shoe Co. v. Wa.,hington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 [66 S.Ct.
154.90 L.Ed. 95. 16] A.L.R. 1057].)
[8b] Jahn's burden of defending here is no greater than
plaintiff's burden of suing in New York. The cause of action
is directly related to J ahn 's dealings with the California
plaintiff and the California defendants. A denial of jurisdiction would lead only to a duplicity of litigation. "[Tlhe
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws" fully justifies subjecting
.1ahn to th£' jurisdiction of our courts.
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
denied.
Gibson, C. J _, Shenk, J., Carter, J'J and Spence, J., eoncurred.
McComb, J .. dissented.
SCHAUER. J., Dissenting.-From th£' record in this ease
the following facts appear: Petitioner has at no time maintained any offices in California. or made any sales or sales
solicitations here.' It is the ex('IU!;ive export agent for Ameri·
can Drying Systems. Inc. (real party in interest). and also
the agent for one other California mannf8('turer. Petitioner
places its orders for purchase of the products of these two
manufacturers by mail or telephone from New York, and.
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although the course of purchases is regular. nO purchase orders
are placed from California. The goods are shipped f.o.b,
,California, .are .packaged for shipping in California, and
are shipped by the manufacturers to a general forwaTdfug'
company in California. The forwarding company is selected
by petitioner, al!d receives its shipping instructions directly
from petitioner. On two occasions, when the orders were
rather large, petitioner sent one of its auditors to California
with the check for payment. and he ascertained that the order
was properly filled before making payment. Petitioner has
apparently had no contacts with California other than those
just mentioned.
In the light of the basic facts it appears that in holding
that petitioner was U doing business in this State" 80 88 to
subject it to service of process pursuant to section 6501 of the
Corporations Code, the majority opinion indicates a trend
toward, if not implicitly an actual, holding that all ·persons
residing and doing business outside California but who place
orders by telephone or correspondence for goods in this state
and who arrange (as they must, if the orders are to be filled)
for packing, shipping and delivery of the goods 80 purchased,
will thereby become subject to the jurisdi~tion of California
courts and subject to suit in this state, Such a holding seem!"
especially unfortunate and undesirable. particularly for the
manufacturers and producers of California. as it must inevita·
bly tend to deter those who are in the market for California
products from sending to this state for them. It is a matter
of common knowledge that efforts are coustantly being made
by the various states on both a governmental and a private
industry level to attract additional industry and commerce.
and .I believe that where, as here, the law is at least equally
open to a contrary ruling, the court should not choose the
course which will be detrimental to the interests of California.
I 'would grant the peremptory wri~
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